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Introduction to Special Issue of Synthese: 
Dispositions and Laws of Nature     
Jennifer McKitrick  
University of Nebraska–Lincoln 
I’d like to say a few words about the genesis of this collection. In May 
2002, Harold Kincaid, the chair of my department at the University of Al-
abama at Birmingham, attended a conference in Ghent on Explanation and 
Causation in the Natural and Social Sciences. There, he met Alice Drewery, 
and in conversation discovered that she, like his junior colleague back in Al-
abama, works on dispositions. Upon his return, he mentioned her to me as a 
possible contact. Almost as an afterthought, he mentioned “You could have 
a small conference on dispositions, and invite her.” “Great!” I was off and 
running. 
Marc Lange and Erik Anderson had both recently published papers on 
dispositions, so I began there. I send them “feeler” emails, and they both ex-
pressed enthusiasm about the idea of a conference on dispositions. Next, I 
contacted David Armstrong and Stephen Mumford, and got them on board 
as well. As I was working to fill out the participant list, I noticed that many 
philosophers who had worked on dispositions worked on laws of nature as 
well, and were interested in the interconnection. I then decided to expand the 
scope of the conference to include laws. I sent out invitations, and all were 
immediately accepted. It seemed like the right topic at the right time. 
Participants asked me if I wanted them to speak on dispositions, laws of 
nature, or both. I said any of those would be fine. Given the amount of lati-
tude speakers had, it was remarkable how nicely the papers covered the is-
sues, and interrelated in interesting, non-redundant ways. The bases were 
covered, the central questions addressed, including: What is a disposition? 
How should we characterize the categorical/dispositional distinction? How 
are dispositions related to counterfactuals? (Heil/Cross) To what extent are 
properties dispositional? (Armstrong/Heil) Are dispositions causally rele-
vant? (Heil/McKitrick) Do laws govern nature? (Mumford) How should we 
characterize laws of nature? (Roberts) How can we distinguish laws from 
other truths? (Roberts/Lange) How are laws related to counterfactuals? 
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(Lange) Are the laws of nature are necessary? Do natural kinds have the dis-
positions they do as a matter of necessity? (Amstrong/Anderson/Drewery). 
The Conference on Dispositions and Laws of Nature was held at the Uni-
versity of Alabama at Birmingham in February 2003, and by all accounts was 
a great success. Upon seeing the program for the conference, John Symons 
of Synthese thought the papers would make an excellent special issue, and so 
here we are. 
Roughly speaking, dispositions are tendencies or powers—a fragile 
glass’s disposition to break when struck. Laws of nature, like Newton’s laws 
of motion, are commonly thought to be true generalizations that supports 
counterfactuals, play an important role in scientific explanation, and can be 
inductively confirmed by their instances. Dispositions and laws are com-
ponents of different, perhaps competing, metaphysical views regarding the 
source of power and activity in the universe. Supposing that dispositions and 
laws of nature exist, in some sense, I see two basic options as to how they are 
related: 
1. Laws give otherwise inert particulars their dispositions. 
2. Particulars have certain dispositions, and general truths about these 
dispositions constitute the laws of nature. 
I suppose one could have a mixed view, whereby laws of nature govern 
particulars, but particulars also have some powers that determine what they 
do. However, it seems that any mixed view is likely to clash internally. Either 
powers fall within the province of laws of nature, or they do not. If they do 
not, then the particulars with those powers are not fully governed by laws, 
and may even violate them. If powers are governed by laws, then in what 
sense do powers determine what particulars do? Both of the basic options 
above construe one of the pair, either dispositions or laws, as primary, the 
other member being derivative, reducible, or perhaps even eliminable. Is ei-
ther view correct? Is there anything to decide between them? 
The nature of properties is fundamental to these issues, so we start off 
with David Armstrong, “Four Disputes about Properties.” Armstrong exam-
ines four fundamental disagreements that philosophers have about the na-
ture of properties, including universals versus tropes, and “properties as at-
tributes of particulars” verses “particulars as bundles of properties.” Of 
central concern is the dispute between those who hold a categorical or qual-
ity account of properties, as apposed to those who see properties as disposi-
tions or powers to act or be acted upon. Another central question is the fol-
lowing: If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, 
or is it necessary? Armstrong’s own answers carve out a view according to 
which properties are categorical, but they stand in necessary relations, and 
thereby bestow powers on particulars. 
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The next three papers primarily concern dispositions. Troy Cross ad-
dresses the basic question, “What is a Disposition?” He argues that at-
tempts to reductively explain the dispositional/categorical distinction fail. 
Cross concludes by suggesting an account of dispositionality that is nonre-
ductive, and yet interesting and informative. In “Dispositions,” John Heil 
articulates a particular account of dispositions, according to which dispo-
sitions (or powers) are actual, intrinsic, irreducible, necessary, first-order 
features of the world. Heil goes on to show the implications of his view 
for philosophy of mind and for primary and secondary qualities. In my pa-
per, I consider a particular question regarding dispositions, “Are Disposi-
tions Causally Relevant?” I begin by focusing on a prior question, “what is 
causal relevance?” Some philosophers appeal to laws of nature to answer 
that question, which again demonstrates the interconnection between the 
issues. I critique various accounts of causal relevance, and explore their im-
plications for dispositions. 
The next three papers involve both laws and dispositions. In “How 
General is Generalized Scientific Essentialism?” Erik Anderson assesses the 
case for essentialism—the doctrine according to which the laws of nature 
are necessary. In terms of dispositions, it is the doctrine according to which 
natural kinds have all of their powers, capacities and propensities as a mat-
ter of necessity. In “Essentialism and the Necessity of the Laws of Nature,” 
Alice Drewery challenges essentialism by questioning the idea that kinds 
have essences that serve as the basis for exceptionless laws of nature. It is 
unclear, according to Drewery, that essences are more basic than laws, or 
that properties have their associated powers essentially. In “Laws and Law-
lessness,” Stephen Mumford criticizes Humean and epistemic arguments 
against laws, as well as realism about laws. Mumford develops an alterna-
tive lawless position called “realist lawlessness,” according to which dis-
tinct properties have necessary connections, which render laws superfluous 
and unwarranted. 
Two final papers primarily concern laws of nature. In “Laws and Their 
Stability,” Marc Lange explores the relation between laws of nature and 
counterfactual truths. Laws of nature are supposed to differ from accidental 
truth in their invariance under counterfactual suppositions. Lange develops 
the notion of “stability” in order to delimit the range of relevant counterfac-
tuals without circularity. John Roberts proposes a “Measurability Account” 
of fundamental physical laws. Robert’s primary nomological concept is that 
of a law relative to a given theory. What makes a proposition a law relative 
to a theory is that it plays an indispensable role in demonstrating that some 
quantity posited by that theory is measurable. 
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Thanks to all the participants of the conference, including commentators 
Eric Loomis, Michael Watkins, Roderick Long, Eric Marcus, Candace Up-
ton, Chase Wrenn, and Michael Patton; the faculty and staff at the University 
of Alabama at Birmingham, especially Minnie Randle, Harold Kincaid, and 
Sara Vollmer; and Meredith Enish and John Symons of Synthese. I hope you 
enjoy the collection. 
